Saturday, September 5, 2026

DXZY Update

SharkWater Trading  •  Venture Desk • Closed-End Funds • NAV Mechanics

Destiny Tech100's NAV Rose 39.7 Percent Last Quarter. Its Largest Holding Is a Treasury Money Market Fund.

August 29, 2026

Bottom Line Up Front

Destiny Tech100 (NYSE: DXYZ) reported net asset value of $34.30 per share as of June 30, 2026, up from $24.56 at March 31. That is a 39.7 percent quarterly gain, and it will get read as portfolio performance. It is mostly not. The fund sold 17,191,674 new shares through its Jefferies at-the-market program during the quarter, roughly a 57 percent increase in the share count, at prices well above the prior NAV mark. Selling stock above NAV lifts NAV per share for everyone already holding it, and by my arithmetic that mechanism accounts for somewhere between 36 and 63 percent of the entire gain.

The range is that wide because the filing contradicts itself. It reports 17,191,674 shares sold at a weighted average price of $34.25, which is $588.8 million gross, and then reports net proceeds of $715,442,732. Net proceeds cannot exceed gross proceeds. One of those three numbers is wrong and the document does not say which.

Meanwhile the money went into Treasuries. 57.3 percent of the June 30 portfolio sits in the First American Treasury Obligations money market fund. The private venture book, the thing anyone buys DXYZ to own, is roughly $700 million of a $1.64 billion portfolio. I am not recommending a position here in either direction, and the last section explains why.

What Was Actually Filed

Destiny put out a Business Wire release at 8:11pm Eastern on Friday, August 28, announcing NAV of $34.30 per share for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, against approximately $1.64 billion of portfolio fair value. The same evening the fund filed Supplement No. 1 to its May 26, 2026 prospectus on Form 424B3, File No. 333-296216, which carries the same NAV figure plus the full position table.

The press release is four paragraphs. The filing is where the story is, and the two most important things in it are not in the release at all.

The First Thing: More Than Half the Fund Is Cash

The 424B3 position table lists First American Treasury Obligations, Class X, at 57.3 percent of portfolio. That is the single largest line by a wide margin. The next largest is Magnitude ANC III, an SPV with economic exposure to Anthropic Series B preferred, at 14.4 percent. Three separate SPVs carrying SpaceX Class A common stock add to 10.5 percent. Two OpenAI vehicles add to 2.6 percent.

So the fund's four biggest exposures, in order, are: Treasury bills, Anthropic, SpaceX, and OpenAI. Only three of those four are venture capital.

Compare the same table one quarter earlier. At March 31, 2026, on a portfolio of approximately $742.5 million, the money market line was 31.4 percent. Cash weight nearly doubled as a share of the fund in three months, and it did so because the at-the-market program was pumping capital in faster than the adviser was deploying it.

A boat rides higher when you pump the bilge dry. It does not ride higher because the water got deeper.

The Second Thing: Most of the NAV Gain Is Issuance

When a closed-end fund trades above NAV and issues new shares at that market price, every dollar raised above book value accrues to existing holders. It is a real economic benefit and it is entirely legitimate. It is also not investment performance, and it does not repeat once the premium closes.

DXYZ issued 17,191,674 shares in the quarter. The filing does not report shares outstanding or total net assets, so I derived the share counts below from the reported NAV per share and the reported approximate portfolio value. That derivation assumes net assets are close to portfolio value, which requires the fund to carry no material leverage. Treat every share count in this table as mine, not the fund's.

LineMar 31, 2026Jun 30, 2026
NAV per share (reported)$24.56$34.30
Approx. portfolio value (reported)$742.5M$1.64B
Money market weight (reported)31.4%57.3%
Implied private book (derived)~$509M~$700M
Shares outstanding (derived)~30.2M~47.8M
ATM shares sold in quarter (reported)8,489,35917,191,674

Source: Form 424B3 Supplement No. 1 dated August 28, 2026 (File No. 333-296216) and Form 424B3 Supplement No. 6 dated May 12, 2026. NAV, portfolio value, money market weight, and ATM share counts are reported figures. Shares outstanding and private book value are DERIVED BY SHARKWATER from those reported figures and are not stated anywhere in the filings. The derivation assumes net assets approximate portfolio value.

Now the decomposition, and here is where the filing fights itself. Reported ATM detail for the quarter reads 17,191,674 shares at a weighted average price of $34.25, with net proceeds of $715,442,732. Multiply the shares by the price and you get $588.8 million gross. Net proceeds are reported $126.6 million higher than gross proceeds, which is arithmetically impossible.

I cannot tell you which figure is broken, so here is what the NAV bridge looks like under each.

ScenarioCapital raisedFrom issuanceFrom portfolio marks
Price times share count ($588.8M)$588.8M$3.51 / 36%$6.23 / 64%
Stated net proceeds ($715.4M)$715.4M$6.18 / 63%$3.56 / 37%

DERIVED BY SHARKWATER, not reported. Splits the $9.74 per share NAV increase between accretion from above-NAV share issuance and change in portfolio marks, under each of the two irreconcilable ATM figures in the August 28, 2026 424B3. Both scenarios rest on the derived share counts in the prior table.

The second scenario reconciles better with the rest of the document. A $168.8 million contribution from marks is close to the roughly $191 million by which the derived private book grew during the quarter, and that $191 million also includes whatever new private capital was deployed inside the quarter. The first scenario requires about $309 million of appreciation inside a private book that only grew $191 million in total, which does not fit unless there were substantial private sales the filing does not disclose.

My read is that the $715.4 million net proceeds figure is the reliable one and that the $34.25 weighted average price is understated, implying an effective issuance price near $41.62. But that is inference, not disclosure, and I am not going to present it as fact. What survives either way: a large minority to a clear majority of the headline NAV gain came from selling stock, not from owning it.

The Control Case: What This Looks Like Without an ATM

Fundrise Innovation Fund (NYSE: VCX) filed its Form NPORT-P for the same quarter end, and it is the cleanest possible comparison because VCX did not issue a single share.

Total net assets of $776,968 thousand at June 30, 2026, against $678,918 thousand at March 31. Divide each by the 35,797,138 shares outstanding reported in the March 31 audited N-CSR and you get exactly $21.70 and exactly $18.97, the two NAV figures the fund reports. The share count did not move. Every cent of that 14.4 percent NAV gain came from marks, and the filing itself shows the source: an $85,947 thousand net change in unrealized appreciation on Level 3 positions, plus $15,442 thousand realized.

Metric, June 30, 2026DXYZVCX
NAV per share$34.30$21.70
Quarterly NAV change+39.7%+14.4%
Shares issued in quarter17,191,6740
NAV gain attributable to marks37% to 64% (derived)100%
Cash / money market weight57.3% of portfolio5.4% of net assets
Largest single exposureTreasury MMF, 57.3%Anthropic, over 20%
Leverage disclosedNone found in 424B3$30.4M Barclays reverse repo

Sources: DXYZ Form 424B3 Supplement No. 1, August 28, 2026. VCX Form NPORT-P for the period ended June 30, 2026, and Form N-CSR for the period ended March 31, 2026. DENOMINATOR WARNING: the two funds do not use the same base. DXYZ states position weights as a percentage of approximate portfolio value. VCX states them as a percentage of net assets. On DXYZ's derived net assets the money market weight is roughly 57.8 percent, so the two are close here, but do not assume that holds in other quarters.

VCX is not the better fund because of this. It carries its own problems, including $30,400 thousand of Barclays reverse repurchase borrowing collateralized by data center CMBS, restricted securities at 82.2 percent of net assets, and single-name Anthropic exposure above 20 percent. The point is narrower. When you see a NAV number from a listed venture fund, the first question is whether the share count moved, and the answer changes what the number means.

What Happened to the Premium

For most of this year the retail conversation about DXYZ has been about its premium to NAV. Against the stale $24.56 mark, the fund looked like it was trading roughly 40 percent rich in late August. Against $34.30 it is trading close to flat.

The premium did not compress. The denominator moved. Nothing about the price had to change for a 40 percent premium to become no premium at all, and anyone who was short the premium and long the thesis that it had to close got the outcome without the mechanism.

This is the recurring lesson with quarterly-marked vehicles and I will keep repeating it. A premium computed against a mark that is two to five months old is a statement about the calendar, not about valuation. It tells you when the fund last opened its books. It does not tell you what the fund is worth today.

The Bull Case

  • The accretion is real money. Issuing above NAV genuinely transfers value to existing holders. Whether it is $3.51 or $6.18 per share, it is not an accounting illusion, and holders through the quarter captured it.
  • The cash is being deployed, and quickly. The filing discloses $169.0 million closed in three transactions after quarter end as of August 27: $150.0 million more into OpenAI on August 13, $15.0 million into Fluidstack on July 16, and $4.0 million into Boom Technology via a SAFE on August 4. That is real velocity against the September quarter.
  • The top of the book is the right book. Anthropic at 14.4 percent, SpaceX at 10.5 percent across three vehicles, OpenAI at 2.6 percent before the August addition. If you want concentrated exposure to those three names in a liquid wrapper, the options are few.
  • Buying near NAV is a different trade than buying at a 40 percent premium. Whatever the mechanism, the entry math available now is not the entry math that was available in June.

The Bear Case

  • You are paying venture fees on a Treasury money market fund. That is the plain reading of a 57.3 percent cash weight. Every dollar in First American Treasury Obligations is a dollar you could hold yourself for a few basis points.
  • The accretion engine only runs while the premium exists. If DXYZ is now near NAV, the largest single driver of last quarter's NAV growth is switched off. Nobody modeling forward growth off a 39.7 percent quarter should expect that rate to repeat.
  • The SpaceX marks may reflect a price the fund cannot yet realize. SpaceX listed on June 12, 2026, inside the quarter. DXYZ holds it through three layered SPVs, one of which the filing describes as investing through multiple underlying SPVs with more than one layer. Public-price marks on locked-up, multiply-nested positions are the most fragile marks in the book.
  • The filing does not reconcile. A prospectus supplement that reports net proceeds exceeding gross proceeds by $126.6 million is a disclosure quality problem, not a rounding problem, and it sits in the one paragraph a buyer most needs to trust.

The SharkWater Take

I am not taking a position and I am not telling you to take one, and the reason is specific rather than squeamish. The single most important input to any DXYZ trade right now is the premium or discount to NAV, and I cannot compute it to a standard I would put my own money behind. I have a hard, primary-sourced NAV of $34.30. I do not have a confirmed Friday closing price, and I do not have a reported share count, which means I do not have net assets either. Two of the three legs are derived and one of the derivations rests on a filing that contradicts itself.

What I will say plainly is that the headline is misleading, and predictably so. Over the next week you will see the 39.7 percent figure quoted as a venture return. It is not one. It is a fund that roughly doubled in size by selling stock at a premium, parked the proceeds in Treasuries, and reported the resulting per-share arithmetic as a quarterly result. The Wolfspeed post in July was the same shape in a different costume: a headline number that was an artifact of a corporate action rather than a description of the business.

The honest version of the DXYZ story is more interesting than the misleading one. A venture fund that is 57 percent cash, deploying $169 million in eight weeks into OpenAI and AI infrastructure, and that has just lost the premium that was funding its own NAV growth, is at a genuine inflection. I would rather write that post in three weeks with a confirmed share count than write a trade today off numbers I had to build myself.

Two things would change my mind and make this actionable. A reported shares outstanding figure and total net assets, which the semi-annual report should carry. And a corrected or clarified ATM disclosure. Until both land, this is a monitoring position, not a trade.

Data Gaps

  • Shares outstanding and total net assets: NOT REPORTED. Neither figure appears in the August 28 424B3 or the press release. Every share count and net asset figure in this post is derived by me from NAV per share and approximate portfolio value, and assumes no material leverage.
  • ATM proceeds: IRRECONCILABLE. 17,191,674 shares at a weighted average $34.25 is $588.8 million gross, against reported net proceeds of $715,442,732. Reported as filed. Not resolved.
  • DXYZ closing price: NOT VERIFIED. No confirmed August 28, 2026 close was obtained from a primary or exchange source. No premium or discount figure in this post is computed against a live price, and the "close to flat" characterization is directional only.
  • DXYZ leverage: NOT CONFIRMED EITHER WAY. The fund filed a 424B5 prospectus supplement for debt securities on May 26, 2026. Whether any debt was drawn as of June 30 is unknown, and if it was, the derived share counts here are overstated.
  • VCX NPORT-P filing date: DISPUTED. One third-party account places it on EDGAR August 26, 2026, another August 28. The document content is confirmed; the accession timestamp is not.
  • Private book values are derived, by subtracting the reported money market weight from the reported approximate portfolio value. The funds do not report a private-only subtotal.
  • No options data appears in this post. No chain was pulled, no premium was modeled, and none should be inferred.

For educational and informational purposes only. Not personalized investment advice, and not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Figures labeled DERIVED are SharkWater calculations, not issuer disclosures, and should be independently verified before use. Closed-end funds investing in privately held companies carry valuation, liquidity, and concentration risks that differ materially from those of listed equities. The author may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own work.

Wednesday, September 2, 2026

Oklo's FERC Complaint Is Real. The Ohio Story Attached to It Might Not Be.

 SharkWater Trading  •  Nuclear Desk • FERC Complaint • Interconnection Risk

Oklo's FERC Complaint Is Real. The Ohio Story Attached to It Might Not Be.

September 2, 2026

Bottom Line Up Front

Oklo Inc. (NYSE: OKLO) fell 5.03 percent to $38.53 on September 1, 2026, a day after PJM Interconnection's withdrawal of a 750 megawatt Oklo project from its study queue prompted an emergency complaint at FERC, docket EL26-101, filed August 28 and asking for a ruling by September 4. Nearly every outlet covering the story has tied that 750 megawatt project to Oklo's Meta-backed Pike County, Ohio campus. The complaint itself never says that.

The primary document names a Dominion-owned substation in Virginia, not a site in Ohio. That gap between what Oklo actually filed and the story built on top of it is where the real risk sits for anyone trading this on the headline alone.

What Oklo Actually Filed

The filing itself is public. Oklo Inc. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., FERC Docket EL26-101, filed August 28, 2026, concerns a 750 megawatt project carrying queue number C01-1735, split across three fuel types: 150 megawatts of advanced nuclear, 300 megawatts of fuel cells, and 300 megawatts of natural gas. PJM pulled the project from its Cycle 01 interconnection study on August 3, 2026, citing Oklo's failure to demonstrate low-voltage ride-through stability across all three fuel types. Oklo's complaint asks FERC to reinstate the project at its original queue position and original Cycle 01 schedule, targeting a final interconnection agreement by May 19, 2028, rather than being pushed to Cycle 02 and a target of July 13, 2029. Oklo calls that roughly a 14-month delay and wants FERC to act on it by September 4, 2026.

The Ohio Story Nobody Can Source to the Filing

Coverage from Utility Dive, Yahoo Finance, and several others has assumed the withdrawn project is the 1.2 gigawatt Meta-backed campus in Pike County, Ohio that Oklo announced in January. The 750 megawatt figure lines up with that project's stated fuel mix, so the assumption is understandable. But the complaint text itself does not mention Ohio, Pike County, or Meta anywhere. The only site reference in the document is to a Possum Point 500 kilovolt substation bus, a real Dominion Energy asset located in Prince William County, Virginia, which is Dominion transmission territory, not the AEP or Duke footprint that covers southern Ohio.

That could mean the press correctly connected dots that exist in correspondence outside the public complaint. It could also mean this is a second, separate Oklo interconnection project, or that the Ohio link is simply wrong. As of this writing, no primary Oklo statement resolves which. No 8-K referencing the PJM dispute has been filed with the SEC.

Filing a FERC complaint over a lost queue position is like losing your spot in the harbor launch line. You can go argue with the harbor master, and you might even get it back. But arguing doesn't return the tide you missed while you were making your case.

The Balance Sheet Behind the Fight

Oklo's 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, filed August 7, 2026, shows cash and equivalents of $1.645 billion plus marketable securities of $1.362 billion, a combined $3.01 billion. Net loss for the first half of 2026 was $81.6 million, with $65.5 million in cash used by operations over the same six months, roughly $32.8 million a month. Management's own language states the cash on hand is sufficient to fund operations for one year from the filing date. Revenue for the first half of 2026 was $1.21 million, described by the company as its first quarterly revenue period, largely from engineering and manufacturing services tied to recent acquisitions. This remains, by any conventional measure, a pre-revenue developer with a large cash cushion and a real burn rate, not yet a power company collecting checks.

The Contracts That Matter More Than One Queue Position

Two agreements anchor the growth story regardless of how the FERC complaint resolves. The Meta agreement, announced January 9, 2026, funds development and fuel procurement for the 1.2 gigawatt Pike County campus through prepayment, structured explicitly as advance funding rather than a traditional long-term power purchase agreement, with phase one targeted as early as 2030 and full buildout by 2034. The Switch agreement, from December 2024, is a non-binding master power agreement for up to 12 gigawatts through 2044, with individual binding contracts to follow as milestones are met. That 12 gigawatt figure shows up constantly in bullish commentary on the stock. It is not contracted revenue. It is a framework for future contracts that may or may not materialize on schedule.

Key Figures, Dated and Sourced

FigureValueSource
Close, Sept 1, 2026$38.53 (-5.03%)Market data, aggregator-sourced
Cash + marketable securities$3.01B, as of 6/30/26Form 10-Q, filed 8/7/26
H1 2026 net loss$81.6MForm 10-Q, filed 8/7/26
H1 2026 revenue$1.21MForm 10-Q, filed 8/7/26
Stated cash runway1 year from 8/7/26Form 10-Q, filed 8/7/26
FERC docketEL26-101, filed 8/28/26PJM-hosted filing PDF, FERC eLibrary
Withdrawn project capacity750 MW (150 nuclear / 300 fuel cell / 300 gas)FERC complaint, docket EL26-101
Market cap~$7.19B, intraday 9/2/26Aggregator (stockanalysis.com)
52-week range$36.61 – $193.84Aggregator (stockanalysis.com)

Market cap, close price, and 52-week range are aggregator-sourced (stockanalysis.com) and not exchange-primary. All filing-derived figures are sourced directly to the named SEC or FERC document. The Pike County, Ohio and Meta association with docket EL26-101 is press-reported, not confirmed in the primary complaint text, and should be treated as unverified.

The Bull Case

  • The cash cushion is real. $3.01 billion against a burn rate near $33 million a month buys years of runway even without new financing, which is unusual for a company this early in commercialization.
  • Licensing is moving faster than the industry norm. The NRC approved Oklo's principal design criteria topical report on May 6, 2026, in less than half the traditional review timeline, which should compress future licensing steps for the Aurora powerhouse design.
  • The Meta funding isn't contingent on this one queue slot. The prepayment structure with Meta is separate from any single PJM interconnection filing, so a resolution against Oklo at FERC does not by itself unwind the underlying commercial relationship.

The Bear Case

  • The headline narrative outruns the primary document. Trading this news as an Ohio, Meta-specific story is trading on an inference the filing itself does not support. If the connection turns out to be wrong, the thesis attached to today's move goes with it.
  • The decline predates the FERC news. Oklo was already down roughly 43 percent year to date through August 31, 2026, and had posted new 52-week lows in the weeks before this complaint. The market was repricing this stock before PJM ever entered the picture.
  • Revenue is not yet a company, it's a rounding error. $1.21 million over six months against a nine-figure quarterly burn means every headline gigawatt figure, contracted or not, is still years from showing up as cash in the door. First commercial power at Aurora-Idaho is not targeted before 2028.

The SharkWater Take

The FERC fight is real, dated, and worth watching into September 4. I am not trading Oklo on the Ohio story until somebody puts a primary document in front of me that actually says Pike County or Meta, because right now that connection is press inference sitting on top of a filing that names a Virginia substation. Strip the unverified narrative away and what's left is a well-funded, pre-revenue nuclear developer whose stock has already been cut in half this year on its own timeline risk, not on this complaint. That's a name to research on its execution against 2028 and 2030 milestones, not one to chase on a FERC deadline three days out.

Tight lines. — SharkWater

Educational and informational purposes only. Not personalized investment advice. All figures sourced as noted and accurate as of publication. Options involve substantial risk of loss. The author may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own work.

Cerebras Fell Three Times Faster Than the Chip Sector. No Filing Explains Why.

 SharkWater Trading  •  Semiconductor Desk • Sell-Off • Customer Concentration

Cerebras Fell Three Times Faster Than the Chip Sector. No Filing Explains Why.

September 2, 2026

Cerebras Systems (Nasdaq: CBRS) closed September 1, 2026 at $172.62, down 6.31 percent, on a day the broader semiconductor tape fell 1 to 3 percent. Intel dropped 3 percent, Nvidia and AMD each fell 2 percent, Broadcom fell 1 percent, and the SOXX semiconductor index fell 2 percent, all attributed to a bond market selloff pushing the 10-year Treasury yield to 4.8 percent. No 8-K, no press release, and no filing of any kind explains Cerebras's extra move, and the stock was already bouncing roughly 6 percent intraday the next morning.

The thing actually worth tracking here isn't Tuesday's air pocket. It's a $25.4 billion contracted backlog whose customer concentration is migrating from two Abu Dhabi entities into one American one: OpenAI.

A Move the Sector Doesn't Explain

Every major chip name was down September 1, 2026, so a Cerebras decline on its own isn't a story. The size of it is. Against Intel's 3 percent, Nvidia and AMD's 2 percent each, Broadcom's 1 percent, and the SOXX index's 2 percent, Cerebras's 6.31 percent drop is two to three times the sector's move on a day with a clear, sector-wide cause already identified in the financial press. That gap is what makes this worth a post rather than a footnote.

A search of Cerebras's SEC filing history turns up nothing in the week before the drop beyond routine Form 4 insider-ownership updates on August 25 and 26. No 8-K. No S-1 amendment. Nothing on the company's own newsroom that surfaced in this research pass. By the next session, the stock had recovered a meaningful chunk of the move, trading back toward $183 intraday on September 2. A sharp, unexplained drop followed by a partial same-week reversal is the signature of a liquidity event, not new information.

A six percent drop on a two percent sector day isn't a storm front. It's a rogue wave. It moves through fast, and most of the time it doesn't tell you a thing about tomorrow's weather.

What's Actually New: Not Much, on the Record

The filings that do exist around this period are a cluster of Form 144 notices, insider intent-to-sell filings, dated August 17 through 21, 2026, alongside routine Form 4s and a Schedule 13D/A on August 18. None of these are unusual on their own. They line up with the first tranche of the company's IPO lockup, roughly 60 million shares, releasing around the August 12, 2026 earnings date. That's routine paperwork tied to a known calendar event, not a fresh catalyst for a Tuesday selloff.

The Real Story: A Loss That Isn't Really a Loss

Cerebras priced its IPO May 13, 2026 at $185 a share and began trading the next day on Nasdaq. Its second quarter, ended June 30, 2026, reported August 12, 2026, showed GAAP revenue of $180.1 million, up 74 percent year over year, and core (non-GAAP) revenue of $209.9 million, up 103 percent. The GAAP number carries a $450.5 million net loss, a figure that looks alarming until you see the core net loss for the same quarter: $6.9 million. The roughly $444 million gap is driven overwhelmingly by two items, per the company's own filing: a non-cash stock-based compensation charge tied to double-trigger RSUs that vested at the IPO, and OpenAI warrant amortization treated as a revenue offset under standard accounting rules. Neither is a cash outflow tied to the day-to-day business.

Cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash, and short-term investments totaled $8.6 billion as of June 30, 2026, with another $850 million in undrawn debt capacity. Remaining performance obligations, the company's contracted backlog, stood at $25.4 billion, tied to more than 600 megawatts of data center capacity under contract. Full-year 2026 core revenue guidance sits at $880 to $890 million.

Backlog Concentration Is Migrating, Not Disappearing

Cerebras has carried heavy customer concentration since well before its IPO. Early S-1 filings showed G42 alone at 83 to 87 percent of revenue in 2023 and 2024. The most recent full disclosure, in an April 2026 S-1 amendment, splits that concentration between MBZUAI at 62 percent and G42 at 24 percent, an 86 percent combined share, both entities linked to Abu Dhabi. The company's Q2 2026 filing describes a small number of customers each contributing 20 to 49 percent of revenue without naming a specific current split.

What's changed, per secondary analysis of the backlog composition that has not been independently confirmed against the underlying filing text, is that OpenAI now represents a large and growing share of that $25.4 billion figure. That's a trade, not a fix: less exposure to Gulf state counterparty risk, more exposure to a single, fast-moving AI lab whose own capital needs and priorities aren't fully public.

Q2 2026 Snapshot

FigureValueSource
GAAP revenue$180.1M (+74% YoY)10-Q / 8-K, filed 8/12/26
Core (non-GAAP) revenue$209.9M (+103% YoY)10-Q / 8-K, filed 8/12/26
GAAP net loss$450.5M10-Q / 8-K, filed 8/12/26
Core net loss$6.9M10-Q / 8-K, filed 8/12/26
Cash + short-term investments$8.6B, plus $850M undrawn debt8-K, filed 8/12/26
Remaining performance obligations$25.4B, as of 6/30/2610-Q, filed 8/12/26
FY2026 core revenue guidance$880M – $890M8-K, filed 8/12/26
Sept 1, 2026 close$172.62 (-6.31%)Aggregator (stockanalysis.com)

Filing figures are drawn from the company's own August 12, 2026 SEC filings as republished on Cerebras's investor relations site; the raw EDGAR documents could not be pulled directly due to a network access issue at time of writing. Price and sector-comparison figures are aggregator-sourced and not exchange-primary.

The Lockup Calendar Worth Circling

The bigger structural event isn't behind Cerebras, it's ahead of it. The main lockup, roughly 171 million shares, about five times the IPO's public float, releases at the earlier of two trading days after Q3 2026 earnings or 180 days after the May 14, 2026 prospectus date, which lands on approximately November 10, 2026. Q3 earnings haven't been scheduled yet, so whichever trigger comes first sets the date. That's the event with the real potential to move this stock on supply alone, not September 1's unexplained air pocket.

The Bull Case

  • Growth is real and accelerating. Core revenue up 103 percent year over year and a $25.4 billion backlog against roughly $373.5 million in first-half 2026 revenue signal a company still early in converting contracted demand into recognized revenue.
  • The GAAP loss is a distraction. Strip out the IPO-linked stock compensation charge and the OpenAI warrant amortization and the core business lost $6.9 million on $209.9 million of core revenue, a fundamentally different picture than the headline $450.5 million loss suggests.
  • The balance sheet can absorb volatility. $8.6 billion in cash and short-term investments plus $850 million in undrawn debt is a deep enough cushion to ride out a rogue-wave session like September 1 without operational consequence.

The Bear Case

  • Concentration risk didn't go away, it changed shape. Rotating from an 86 percent Abu Dhabi-linked customer base into heavy OpenAI exposure trades one single point of failure for another.
  • GAAP gross margin is thin. The 14.2 percent GAAP gross margin in Q2, against a core margin closer to 41 percent that itself declined from roughly 46.5 percent in Q1, is worth watching for a trend, not a one-quarter blip.
  • The stock has already shown it can move 15 to 20 percent on a headline. Between the June 24 earnings miss, the August 12 to 13 post-earnings drop, and the unexplained September 1 move, this name has posted four separate double-digit swings since its May IPO. The lockup unlock around November is the next scheduled one.

The SharkWater Take

I'm treating September 1 as noise until something surfaces to say otherwise. A move three times the sector's, with no filing behind it and a same-week reversal, reads like a liquidity air pocket in a stock that's been thinly seasoned since its May IPO, not a repricing of the business. The number I'd actually build a calendar around is the lockup unlock near November 10, roughly five times the current float coming free at once. That's a real, dated, mechanical supply event. Tuesday's six percent drop was not.

Tight lines. — SharkWater

Educational and informational purposes only. Not personalized investment advice. All figures sourced as noted and accurate as of publication. Options involve substantial risk of loss. The author may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own work.

A Director Bought AST SpaceMobile Into a Five Percent Drop. It Gapped Up Nine Percent the Next Morning.

 SharkWater Trading  •  Space Desk • Insider Buy • Launch Risk

A Director Bought AST SpaceMobile Into a Five Percent Drop. It Gapped Up Nine Percent the Next Morning.

September 2, 2026

AST SpaceMobile (Nasdaq: ASTS) closed September 1, 2026 at $55.80, down 5.58 percent, the tail of a month that had already taken the stock down roughly 15 percent following an August 10 revenue miss, $31.5 million against consensus near $35 million, and lingering questions about launch vehicle dependency after an April 2026 failure. Director Adriana Cisneros reportedly bought roughly $619,000 of stock across family accounts on August 31, and shares were gapping up over 9 percent intraday the next morning, though neither the purchase nor the bounce is yet confirmed against a primary SEC filing.

Behind both moves sits a company with $2.3 billion in cash, a $1.3 billion contracted backlog, and a constellation that is still roughly three years from the continuous coverage its carrier partners are waiting on.

The Selloff in Context

AST SpaceMobile's second quarter, reported August 10, 2026, showed revenue of $31.5 million against a GAAP net loss of $0.77 per Class A share, with first-half revenue at $46.3 million and a first-half GAAP loss of $1.43 per share. Full-year revenue guidance was reaffirmed at $150 million to $200 million, and the company reported more than $125 million in U.S. government awards for the quarter alone against a stated $1.3 billion aggregate contracted revenue backlog. Secondary sources disagree on the exact adjusted, non-GAAP loss figure, one puts it at $0.44 a share against a $0.28 estimate, another at $0.35 against the same estimate, and neither reconciles cleanly against the company's own release. Take the GAAP numbers as the anchor: a revenue miss, a loss that widened, and guidance that held.

From a December 31, 2025 close of $72.63 to the September 1, 2026 close of $55.80, the stock is down roughly 23 percent year to date, a slide that runs well ahead of Tuesday's single session.

An Insider Bought the Dip, Probably

Multiple secondary sources, though not yet a confirmed primary SEC filing, converge on the same transaction: director Adriana Cisneros purchased 10,822 shares across spouse, adult child, and trust-linked accounts on August 31, 2026, in a price range of $57.00 to $58.87, for a total near $619,000, bringing her indirect beneficial ownership to 797,023 shares. By the next morning, shares were reported trading as high as $61.70 intraday, a gain of more than 9 percent from the prior close, a move one secondary outlet attributed directly to the disclosed insider purchase. Both the filing and the bounce need direct EDGAR confirmation before either is treated as settled fact, and the intraday figure will be stale by the time this posts.

Buying into a five percent down day on your own stock is like a captain stepping onto a boat that's already taking on water. It doesn't mean the boat is sinking. It might just mean the captain knows exactly where the bilge pump is.

The Launch Story Is Two Stories, Not One

BlueBird 7 was lost on a Blue Origin New Glenn launch on April 19, 2026, after insufficient thrust on the vehicle's second burn left the satellite in too low an orbit to sustain. The FAA closed its mishap investigation roughly a month later and cleared New Glenn to fly again. Every AST SpaceMobile launch since, June 17 and August 5, 2026, has flown on Falcon 9, bringing the company's in-orbit count to 13 as of the August 10 earnings report.

Separately, on August 26, 2026, SpaceX said its Pad 40 launch that day was the last planned Falcon 9 Starlink mission from Florida, with future Florida Starlink launches shifting to Starship. Press coverage connected that announcement to AST SpaceMobile's own launch risk, but the SpaceX statement was specifically about Starlink missions and did not name AST SpaceMobile. One analysis of the move went further, arguing that freeing up Pad 40 Starlink slots could actually help AST's own booked flights rather than hurt them. Real risk and an overstated press narrative can coexist here, and right now the evidence points to both.

What $2.3 Billion in Cash Actually Buys

Cash and equivalents stood at $2.288 billion as of June 30, 2026, with pro forma liquidity above $3.7 billion including a $1.0 billion senior convertible note priced July 15, 2026 at a 1.625 percent coupon. That capital is funding a constellation still short of its near-term target: 13 BlueBirds in orbit against a goal of roughly 45 satellites by early 2027, a timeline the company itself has pushed back from its earlier end-of-2026 target, attributing the delay to launch vehicle availability and manufacturing logistics. Commercial service today is described as beta, intermittent rather than continuous, running on more than 60 mobile network operator partnerships covering upward of 3 billion subscribers, working on existing AT&T and Verizon phones without new hardware.

Key Figures, Dated and Sourced

FigureValueSource
Sept 1, 2026 close$55.80 (-5.58%)Aggregator (Yahoo Finance)
Q2 2026 revenue$31.5MCompany release, 8/10/26
Q2 2026 GAAP loss per share$(0.77)Company release, 8/10/26
FY2026 revenue guidance$150M – $200M, reaffirmedCompany release, 8/10/26
Contracted revenue backlog~$1.30BCompany release, 8/10/26
Cash and equivalents$2.288B, as of 6/30/26Company release, 8/10/26
Pro forma liquidity>$3.7B, incl. July convertible notesCompany release, 8/10/26
Satellites in orbit13, as of 8/10/26Company release, 8/10/26
Constellation target~45 satellites by early 2027Company statement, via secondary report
Reported director purchase~10,822 sh, ~$619K, 8/31/26Secondary sources, NOT VERIFIED against EDGAR

Company release figures are drawn from AST SpaceMobile's own August 10, 2026 earnings materials. Price figures are aggregator-sourced. The director purchase rests on three convergent secondary sources and has not been confirmed against a primary EDGAR filing at time of writing; the constellation target is company-stated but sourced here through a secondary report of the underlying materials.

The Bull Case

  • The balance sheet isn't the risk here. $2.3 billion in cash and pro forma liquidity above $3.7 billion is a real backstop against launch delays or a slower ramp than guided.
  • The carrier network is already built. More than 60 mobile network operator partnerships covering upward of 3 billion subscribers means the commercial pipe is in place; what's missing is satellites, not customers.
  • An insider put real money behind the dip. A $619,000 purchase by a sitting director during a five percent down day is a genuine signal, not routine compensation-related paperwork, if it holds up under EDGAR confirmation.
  • Guidance held through the miss. Reaffirming $150 million to $200 million in full-year revenue despite a Q2 shortfall suggests management isn't seeing the miss as a trend.

The Bear Case

  • The constellation timeline keeps slipping. The company's own language pushed continuous coverage from end-2026 to early 2027, and cited launch vehicle availability as a cause, that's a company-acknowledged execution risk, not a media invention.
  • Launch provider concentration is real. With New Glenn's only BlueBird flight ending in the loss of the satellite, every subsequent launch has flown on Falcon 9. A second reliable provider has not been clearly identified in company materials.
  • Revenue is still a rounding error against the story. $31.5 million in quarterly revenue against a $1.3 billion backlog and a multi-billion dollar cash position means the gap between contracted promise and delivered, billed service remains wide.
  • Commercial service is still beta. Intermittent, not continuous, coverage means the carrier partnerships are not yet generating the kind of recurring revenue the valuation implies.

The SharkWater Take

I read the insider buy as a real signal once it's confirmed. A director putting $619,000 of her own money in on a five percent down day isn't routine, and a $2.3 billion cash position means AST isn't going to be forced into a bad financing decision just to keep satellites flying. What I'm not buying is that the launch story is fully resolved. The company's own words pushed continuous coverage back to early 2027 and named launch vehicle availability as the reason, while press coverage in the same week treated an unrelated SpaceX Starlink scheduling note as an AST-specific risk. Both things can be true at once: genuine execution risk in the launch cadence, and a narrative running ahead of what's actually been said. I'd rather own the cash cushion and the backlog than chase Tuesday's drop or Wednesday's bounce.

Tight lines. — SharkWater

Educational and informational purposes only. Not personalized investment advice. All figures sourced as noted and accurate as of publication. Options involve substantial risk of loss. The author may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own work.

Sunday, August 30, 2026

THE RUBBER BAND TRADE: RSI EXTREMES AND CREDIT SPREADS

 SHARKWATER TRADING · STRATEGY DESK

THE RUBBER BAND TRADE: RSI EXTREMES AND CREDIT SPREADS

August 30, 2026 · Trading Strategy · Options / Technicals
BLUF

A trader's timeline post claims 200% a year fading RSI extremes, buying under 20, selling at 80, shorting the reverse, and running 0-5DTE credit spreads at the same levels for 1-2% three times a week. The mechanic is real and tradeable. The number is unverified. Below is a workable framework, the risk that gets people run over, and Monday's watchlist.

THE SETUP

RSI mean reversion is the trading equivalent of a stretched rubber band. Pull it far enough in one direction and the snap-back becomes the higher-probability bet, at least until the band breaks instead of snapping back. That "breaks instead of snaps back" case is a stock in a real downtrend grinding through RSI 15 for two weeks straight. That's the whole risk of this strategy in one sentence.

Track 1: Directional Reversal

  • Long entry: RSI(14) crosses back above 20 from below, don't buy the falling knife, wait for the turn
  • Long exit: RSI hits 80, or a trailing stop under the recent swing low, whichever comes first
  • Short entry: RSI crosses back below 80 from above
  • Short exit: cover near RSI 20

Track 2: Credit Spreads at the Extremes

This is the actual edge behind the claimed 200%/year, defined risk collects premium instead of betting on direction alone.

  • RSI ≤ 20 → sell a put credit spread below price
  • RSI ≥ 80 → sell a call credit spread above price
  • 0-5 DTE, sized for 1-2% account return per trade, targeting Monday/Wednesday/Friday entries

SHARKWATER TAKE

BULL CASE

Defined-risk spreads at statistical extremes on liquid names is a legitimate, repeatable edge that professional options desks run every day. Small, frequent wins compound fast on paper.

BEAR CASE

No backtest, drawdown data, or track record accompanies the claim. RSI ignores trend context, an oversold stock in a real downtrend just stays oversold. 0DTE credit spreads carry gap risk a screenshot doesn't show.

THE TAKE

Run this as a framework, not gospel. Add a trend filter before fading RSI alone, backtest the specific tickers you trade, and size every position like the 200% claim is aspirational, not expected.

MONDAY WATCHLIST (8/31)

RSI as of Friday's close on liquid, optionable names. Confirm premarket before entering, weekend gaps move these fast.

Oversold, RSI < 27

TickerRSIPrice
BHF17.3$52.27
DVA24.2$173.82
NI25.1$40.62
TJX25.4$140.53
CNP25.6$38.77
PEG26.1$72.61
CRUS26.1$115.33
CPRI26.5$13.65
GOLF26.5$88.82
WB25.1$7.03

Overbought, RSI > 77

TickerRSIPrice
MSFT78.1$499.99
CACI78.3$644.43
TEAM78.6$149.07
ABNB79.1$178.07
REGN80.3$784.36
SNOW80.7$330.49
IDCC80.7$344.56
U81.3$43.00
GRMN77.9$310.89

Options strikes and premiums must be pulled from a live broker chain before executing, nothing above is a real quote. RSI levels are calculated from Friday's close and will drift with the weekend and Monday's open. This is strategy research for educational purposes, not investment advice. Size positions and manage risk accordingly.

Fair winds and following seas.